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Applying the Categorical Imperative
in Kant's Rechtslehre
Nelson Potter

During the last forty years there has been considerable discussion of the application of the categorical imperative to derive conclusions concerning particular moral duties and rights in Kant's moral philosophy. Much attention was focused on the
four examples of such applications that occur in Chapter Two of the Groundwork,
especially the first presentation of those examples, in relation to the "universal
law" formulation of the categorical imperative, as opposed to their second runthrough in the same chapter, in relation to the second formulation of the categorical
imperative, on respect for persons. In more recent years the often fuller discussions
of such applications that are found in the second half of Kant's late work Metaphysics of Morals, the part called Doctrine of Virtue (Tugendlehre), have provided a
useful supplement to those earlier discussions. For example, I think Kant is more
successful in arguing that the act of suicide is contrary to morality in the Tugendlehre than in the Groundwork. As one might expect, a considerable variety of views
have been presented: Some writers tried to defend Kant's applications, and others
emphasized critique, and what were said to be systematic inadequacies.
In this ongoing discussion there is one sort of application of the categorical imperative that has still been neglected. That is the application of the version of the
categorical imperative that is found in the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals,
called the Rechtslehre, the Doctrine of Right. My aim in thi s essay is to give an introduction to the issues of applying the categorical imperative to derive conclusions
concerning Recht.
The main applications in the Rechtslehre that can be discussed as examples of the
application of the categorical imperative are (I) Kant's development of the idea of
property rights, (2) his discussion of the idea of hereditary nobility, and (3) his discussion of punishment. These are: the most explicit and detailed examples of such
applications in the Rechtslehre (there are briefer mentions of such topics as slavery
and the proclamation of church doctrine as infallible). In this paper, the focus will
be on Kant's argument against a hereditary aristocracy, which argument will be examined in some detail to show how such applications are to go and to make it clear
that the categorical imperative is to be applied in this area of external right as well
as to internal ethical examples. The sample application concerning hereditary nobility, in addition to being discussed in the Rechtslehre is also discussed in an earlier
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essay usually referred to as Theory and Practice. I will compare the formulations of
the categorical imperative found in the Groundwork and those found in the
Rechtsfehre, as well as comparing applications in the two works.
Kant introduces in two different works his argument against a hereditary aristocracy, in both instances as a singular, free-standing argument, against the idea of a
hereditary nobility. I quote al length:
Now the question is whether the sovereign is entitled to establish a nobility. insofar as it is
an estate intelTTledinte between himself and the rest of the citizen<; thaI COIl he inheriled
What this question COffies down to is not whether it would be prudent for a sovereign to do
Ihis, with a view (0 his own or the people's advantage. but only whether it would be in
accord with the rights of the people for it to have .m estate of persons above it who, while
themselves subjects, are still born rulers (or at least privileged) with respect to the people
The answer 10 this question comes from the same principle as the reply to the preceding
one: "What a people (the entire ma% of the subjects) cannot decide with regard to itself
and its fellows, the sovereign can also not decide with regard to it." Now an hereditary
nobility is a rank that precedes merit and also provides no basis to hope for merit. and is
thus a thought-entity without any reality... [Merit is not inherited.] ... Since we cannot
admit that .my human being would throwaway his freedom, it is impossible for the general
will of the people to assent to such a gtoundless prerogative. and therefore for the sovereign to validate it. l

In Theorv and Practice Kant writes:
It is instead only an ideal of reason. which, however, has its undoubted practical reality,
namely to bind every legislator to give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen
ftom the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to
he !1 ('iti7en. Il~ if he hilS j'Jineo:! it} lIotil'.g for such ~ will. For !hls is the touchtlone of al'.)'
public law's conformity with right. In other words, if a public law is so constituted that a
whole people could nOl possibly give its consent to it (as, e.g., that a cenain class of sllbjeers should have the hereditary privilege of rutin!: rank), it is unjust; but if it is onlv possi·
ble thai a people could agree to it, it is a duty to consider the law just, even if the people is
at present in such a ~ituation or frame of minu that, if consulteu about it. it would probably
refuse its consent. 2
Kant then in a footnote gives the elise of a war tliX, which the people might judge
to be unnecessary. But there is no nece~sity or certainty that this would be their
judgment; since it is "possible that the war is unavoidable and the tax indispensable. the tax must hold in a subject's judgment as in confonnity with right." But if

I MS, VI. 329. References to Kant's works will use an abbrevialed form. First will come
an abbreviation for the name of the work: MS is Metaphysics of Morals (1797). G is Ground·
work of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). TP is "On the common saying; That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice,"(17931, also referred to more brietly as Theory
and Pranice. References are to the volume and page of the passage in the Berlin Academy
Edition. These numbers are induueJ in the margins of most tHmslaiions. The translations
used are from Immanuel Kant. Practical Philo,wplt)', translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor,
Cambridge; Cambndge Umvet>ily Press, 1'::196.
1 Tp, VIII. 297.
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the tax were distributed so that certain landowners were burdened and others exempted, "... it is easily seen that a whole people could not agree to a law of this
kind, and it is authorized at least to make represemations against it, since it cannot
take this unequal distribution of burdens to be just. ,,3
Kant's discussion continues in the next paragraph, distinguishing between the
rights of the people (for equality) and the desire of the people for happiness, which
is not relevant to moral issues. The basic rights are those of liberty, He sums up,
"For provided it is not self-contradictory that an entire people should agree to such a
law, however bitter they might find it, the law is in confonnity with right.',4 Finally,
he goes on to argue against the right of revolution, concluding with a distinction:
, , the people too has its inalienable rights against the head of state, although these
cannot be coercive rights...5 And sums things up with this phrase: " What a people
cannot decree for itse~f, a legislator also cannot decree for a people. ,,6 The distinction here, which we will discuss further below, is one between a choice which would
be a priori impossible, and a choice which merely reflects an (empirical) preference.
Let us discuss some of the characteristics of this application of the categorical
imperative in the realm of Recht. The character of an hereditary nobility is that it is
an infringement on the equal freedom of those who are not members of this class
prior to any action by anyone, which would be a source of merit or demerit. So the
thought is that for example a citizen who is a commoner must have agreed in advance (as it were, from a Rawlsian original position) to have less freedom than
certain others, where Ihis distinction has no basis in merit, and is prior to any action on anyone's part. There could be no reason at such a point for anyone to acct"'p' ::lnythine It"'ss th::ln eCJ.ll~1 freerlom, or for ,myone else to give me more freerlom
than she has. This rule would presumably apply to all preexisting privileges. But
property rights are acquired rights, and as such would follow rather than precede
acts of the agent (with the possible exception of inherited wealth). So inequalities
of property can be perfectly acceptable since they may reflect the wise and unwise
choices of the agents, and this includes inheritance.
One theme in this discussion is the distinction between prudence and right. Matters of prudence are matters relating 10 happiness and welfare, and prosperity or its
lack. Matters of right are those relating to the quite different factors of morality
and the rights of persons. Kant in the discussion of hereditary aristocracy is concerned with the latler.
There is a seemingly related distinction] between matters which the people
"could not possibly" give their consent to, and those matters which they might not
.1 TP. VIII, 297n.

TP. VIII, 299
:; TP. VIII, 303.
b TP. VIII, 304.
7 See Kant's footnote. TP. VIII. 297n.

4
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choose to consem to, but which it would be possible for them to consent to. Now

the word "possibly" suggests modality, and hence the a priori. What the people
would actually consent to or not would be a merely empirical issue, and hence a
question nOI relevant to the present moral question. Kant's example is a war tax,
which the people might feel would weigh too heavily on citizens and which they
would choose to oppose, on the ground that the war was not needed. Here there is,
one suspects, no question of justice in Kant's view but merely a question of preference. A question of justice would be raised by a law which taxed some citizens of
a similar status differently from others of the same slatus. The nature of the distinction is not given in Kam's example, and one would wish to know what would be a
good example here: taxing redhead~ differently from blondes, resident~ of Danzig
differently from residents of Riga?
Now Kant is of course writing prior to the ninNeenth century development of
the notions of diminishing marginal utility, and the Marxian conceptions the injustice of class distinctions, and hence treating the bourgeousie differently from the
working class. So it becomes difficult and seemingly unhistorical to ask questions
about Kantian justice in relation to such ideas. The graduated income tax is based,
it seems, on the idea that those who are wealthier can afford to pay taxes at a higher rate on the dollar than those of lower income. The idea of diminishing marginal
utility might be invoked here to urge that the sacrifice required by deprivation
through taxation would be just only if it recognized the principle of diminishing
marginal utility. One possibly Kantian alternative would be a flat tax, with all of
one's income taxed at the same flat rate, rather than at a rate that increases with
higher income. And a third alternative, a denial of the idea of an income tax, would
be the idea that a Kamian would have to opt for equality of taxes of the sort found
in the head lax: everyone paying the same amount regardless of income. Can there
be any traction found for preferring one basis for allocating tax burdens to another
based on Kamian principles of justice?
Kant's discussion does not answer Ihis question. It rather seems that he is thinking of the citizens weighing the benefils of a war against the burdens of the taxation it would require, and thinking that that comparative weighing of burdens is
merely an empirical procedure or matter of preference. rather than a moral issue of
injustice. And perhaps more broadly, we could say that for Kam heavy taxes, if not
unfairly distributed, could not be unjust, or violative of anyone's rights, or even
raise moral questions.
We might think there is an analogous distinction involved in allowing laws to be
valid that do not violate a written constitution (as in the United States). Perhaps the
people's elected representatives may enact foolish or misguided measures, or they
may fail to respond adequately to difficult conditions_ But then they would be voted
out of office at the next election, as was Herbert Hoover in 1932. On the other hand,
if a law violates the constiMion, then it can be struck down (under the U. S. Constitution, by the judiciary) as going beyond the proper power of govemment to act.
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Now Kant never says anything about elections, and certainly Frederick the Great
was not elected to office, In this context Kant's claim that the people must accept a
war tax that most would wish to reject, because they might be mistaken in their
judgment, and that the only kind of law or institution that would violate rights
would be one that was an a priori violation of the sort found in an institution of
hereditary aristocracy, might seem to allow very little power to the people even to
define their rights, or to have any basis for deciding questions of policy. Furthermore, KaRl insists that the people do have rights against the sovereign, but that
these rights are non-coercive rights,~ But we cannot pursue this complicated issue
here. If the citizens have no right to object to heavy taxes levied to carry out a war,
then what kind of rights could they present as a basis for participating in state poliey decisions? Their rights might seem to be extremely limited, and an authoritarian government like that in Prussia during Kant's life might be, so it would seem,
completely unobjectionable on grounds of Kantian political philosophy. And then
Kant would be much less the Rousseauian radieal republican and defender of
equality that he has seemed to be.
Alternalively, Kant's distinction between the a priori issues of justice and the
empirical considerations of preference, might be considered 10 be analogous 10 the
distinction Ronald Dworkin makes in his philosophy of law between issues of
rights (or principles) and policy.9 Judges are primarily concerned with matters of
rights and injustice, and not nearly so much with mere questions of which policy
of government aclion is to be preferred. The latter are polilical questions, which
admit of bargaining and compromise, and may revolve around empirical questions
such as (to give a current example, quite foreign to Kant) how best to use tax policy to slimulate economic development In this vein, cigarettes and liquor may be
taxed heavily as socially undesirable vices, while food may remain without sales
tax because it is a necessity of life, or imported products may be more heavily
taxed than the same products produced domestically in order to stimulate the domestic economy.. Such decisions would be merely policy decisions, not involving
matters of justice or injustice. Kant says (MS, VI, 318), "By the weB-being of a
state is understood, instead, that condition which reason, by a categorical impera·
tive, makes it obligatory to strive after."lo
Another feature of the votes of the will of the people in this case is that they
would be required to be unanimous. What is the significance of this requirement?
First, notice that it involves once again an echo of the idea of the a priori, for the
marks of the a priori, as Kant tells us in the first Critique. are necessity (already
mentioned), and universality. Empirically we can have at best an accidental uni8 TP. VIII, 303.

Ronald Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.
See pp. 22 - 28.
9

10 MS, VI. 318. This quotation is also an example of Kant talking about the "categorical
imperative" in Ihe context of Recht. See below

,.
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versality. as would occur if all the coins in my pocket happened to be quarters.
Secondly, notice that Rawls also expeps that votes in the original position will be
unanimous! I. This is a mark of the fact that those voting in the original position
are behind the veil of ignorance, or, to put the same point in a different way, that
such votes are made in abstraction from most of the features of volers in virtue of
which they would be able to vote their self-interest, e.g., in voting concerning proposals that would benefit women rather than men, old rather than young, rich
rather than poor. athletically or intellectually gifted rather than those lacking such
gifts, the religious versus the nonreligious, city as opposed to rural residents, and
on and on and on. $0 in both Rawls and Kant we may say that such votes abstract
from a considerable range of empirical characteristics of the voters. and it is this
abstraction that leads to unanimity. And in the case of both philosophers also, this
abstraction marks the distinction between considerations of justice and rights,
which require an at least relatively a priori (abstracted) point of view, and considerations of policy, concerning how best to achieve certain benefits for certain
groups. (E.g., lower the capital gains tax? Provide an income tax deduction for
mortgage interest?).
Notice that this example of hereditary nobility, which was certainly a live question of political philosophy in the time and place where Kant wrote, is hardly so in
the United States or Europe of the late 20 th century. In this connection. Kant explicitly assumes the acceptability of inherited wealth, even though such inheritance
or its lack in the lives of different individuals might be equally independent of personal merit, just as is hereditary nobility. Perhaps this is an inconsistency on Kant's
part. Also notice that Rawls has generalized this Kantian idea of inheritance that is
unrelated to personal merit and accomplishment by his discussion of the "natural
lottery" and the advantages ano disadvantages thal it distributes or withholds:
health, intelligence. beauty, athletic ability, artistic talent, etc.
The reason Why Kant tells us an hereditary nobility would not be universally
agreed to is because anyone excluded from it could never be supposed willing to
"throwaway his freedom". It is therefore a "groundless prerogative" (but so is innate intelligence, health, physical beauty, perhaps inherited wealth). Hence such an
idea "could [not] have arisen from the united will of a whole people:' and "a whole
people ('Quid not possibly give its consent to it:,!2 Those denied such a special privilege could have no reason to vote for it, for the reason that they would thereby
deny themselves privileges which they would have no opportunity to achieve
themselves, and there is (could be) no reason for them to do such a thing. And Kant
insists lhat such a result is a matter of necessity, not a merely empirical result, since
merely empirical results would pertain merely to the happiness of the subjects,
rather than to their rights. Compare the voters in Rawls' original position, where
individuals hehind a veil of ignorance (which is itself at least a major panial excluJohn Rawls. ATheory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.
12 TP, VIII. 297

II
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sion of the empirical) would vote (always, according to Rawls, unanimously, because there would be no basis in personal knowledge for one voter to choose differently from another), and would not vote for matters that would adversely affect
their own interest. Now the interest, arguably, in Kant, is freedom, which commoners in the case of a hereditary aristocracy, would have less of.
Now let us compare this Recht-based discussion of hereditary nobility with
Kant's famous argument in the second example in the Groundwork against making
a lying promise. in order to obtain money one needs. To detennine whether such
an action is right.
I therefore turn the demand of self-love into a universal law and put the question as follows:
how would it be if my maxim became a universal law? I then see at once that it could never

hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. For. the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to be in
need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make
the promise and the end one might have in it itself impossible,since no one would believe
what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses. 13
The main difference between these two cases, I think, revolves around the Kantian concept of the "lawgiver" (Gesetzgeber).14 "One who commands (imperans)
through a law is the lawgiver (legislator). "I~ Lawgiving, Kant tells us in the Me/aphvsics Of Morals has two elements: first, the law itself, which presents a certain
kind of action as objectively necessary, and secondly an incentive, which in the
case of Recht would be the desire to avoid punishment by the state for wrongdoing,
and in the case of Ethics would be an incentive of inner commitment to morality,
In the example of hereditary nobility, (I C(lse from Rprh/, the lawgiver is the sovereign, and the sovereign is identified with those voting to establish the general will,
somewhat like the members of the kingdom of ends in the Groundwork. These are
persons abstractly conceived, and the "touchstone,,16 for testing the moral acceptability of existing or proposed laws is how such persons would vote, Now clearly
the kingdom of ends is not to be identified with any actual legislature; it is an abstract, ideal entity, "only an ideal o/reason,d7 These voting persons are imagined
to be voting their basic self-interest (in some broad sense), for the hereditary nobility proposal fails 10 altain a unanimous vote because it would involve the voting
commoners "throwing away [their] freedom":x And we can see this Just from abstractly considering the proposal, rather than from any empirical weighing of benefits against burdens (the sort of considerations involved in policy decisions). It
seems in these discussions that Kant considers the value of freedom as a priori, in
IJ
14

I~

G, V, 422.

SeeMS, VI,2ISf.

16

MS, VI, 227.
TP, VIIl, 297.

17

Ibid.

I~

MS, VI, 329.
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contrast to the values having to do with welfare and happiness that are parts of
considerations of prudence. But we qm still, at least in some broad sense, say that
these voting persons are voting their self-interest. The elements of self-interest thai
are more cenlral here are those involving political fight:> and freedom - e.g., the

right to vote, to attain office, to have one's property rights and rights to be free
from personal harm protected - rather than welfare rights (there is an analogous

distinction in Rawls). My point in speaking of voting self-interest here is to say
that these votes are nol themselves the resulls of moral decisions; rather such votes
collectively are constitutive of right and justice.

Now, if one were, let us suppose, a king or an elected member of congress (a
law making body), then one should according to Kant use this ideal of reason, of
how these votes should go, to guide one's votes or decisions to establish laws. For
example, one should not vote to establish a heredilary aristocracy, and one should
vote to establish (retributively) appropriate punishments for crimes, and should not
vote for unjust systems of taxation (though as we have seen above, just how we
deteonine such are difficult to make out from what Kant tells us). Of course, these
votes are morally infooned; they presuppose moral judgments about certain social
arrangements violating and others upholding people's rights.. But those moral
judgments themselves presuppose nonmoral jUdgments about how certain social
arrangements would protect or fail to protect the freedom (self-interest, in a certain
sense) of people falling under such laws. Analogously, Rawls insists that votes taken in the original position do not presuppose any moral principles, and are rather
based on calculations of self-interest; the results of such votes (which votes can be
deduced from general facts about human society, and agents) are constitutive of
the basic principles of right or justice.
In contrast to such deliberations concerning Recht, in ethical issues, as the above
quotation from Kant's famous lying promise discussion shows, the deliberation is
taking place within the mind of a single person. The deliberation involves a
thought experimem: What would happen if everyone made lying promises to get
what he wants? The conclusion is that in such a (contrary to fact) situation no one
would be able to achieve his end of receiving needed funds through the means of
making a promise to repay it. This would be because if making lying promises
were a universal practice. people would soon learn not to trust or rely on (hem.
This then, further, entails that if I, as an individual moral agent, making such a lying promise, am taking unto myself an advantage I cannot possibly give to everyone else. i.e., an unjustified, because morally arbitrary and unfair advantage, then
the action in question is wrong. 19 Making such a lying promise would thus be contrary to morality, and the discussion is a specifically ethical discussion because the
conclusion is that the agent who has gone through this process of deliberation has
an (inner) duty to constrain himself from performing any such wrongful action.
19 For more detailed di,cussion of this example, .')ee my "How to Apply lhe Categorical
Imperative," Philosophia 5 (1975), pp. 395-416.
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The issues in the case of a proposed hereditary aristocracy and making a lying
promise are the same: each involves unjustified, arbitrary, special privileges for
some at the expense of others. This is the essence of Kantian morality, whether it
deals with Law or Ethics, outer or inner duty, the incentive of avoiding punishment
or the incentive of inner self-constraint that is essential to the ethical. The deliberators in the Recht case are considering proposed laws and arrangements of society for taxation, for punishment of antisocial actions, for arranging distributions of staIUS and power, etc. And the deliberators in the lying promise case and other such
cases are thinking through a personal moral decision. But after these differences
are taken account of, the similarities of the arguments are also quite great. And the
moral principle at work in both sorts of cases is quite similar: a principle prohibiting arbitrary special privilege, taking unto oneself advantages that cannot be
equally shared, etc. The deliberators in eacn case are lawgivers, as I've said, and in
each case the lawgiver consults his own reason. The law that is given in the lying
promise case is an inner ethical law that would require the agent to constrain his
actions through inner motives and making of choices so as not to act contrary to il.
The law that is the product of deliberation in the hereditary aristocracy case would
guide legislators (whether a sin.gle monarch Or a representative member of a legislature, Or a member of a democratic assembly) so that they did not establish an
inherited aristocracy, and would advise them (0 move away from and refonn such
already existing arrangements. Thus the thought-product of a priori moral reasoning prOVides nonns that would be useful for guiding changes and refonns in existing social structures. The final product of lawgiving in this instance would be legal
structures (hence social structures, external to the individual agent) tnat confonned
with Jl)ofal requirements. Since the lawgiving is external, the bwgiver is the legislator, who detennines the subject's choice "by the will of another,,20 The Jaws actually enacted into law by the sovereign constitute positive law, and the ideal or
correct laws. that are in accord with moral law, are naturallaws. 21
Now let us turn our attention to the somewhat different fonnulations of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork and in the Rechtslehre. Kant states the "universal principle of right" in the Rechtslehre 22 as follows:
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in aco;:ordance with a universai law. or if on its maxim (he freedum uf o.:lK,j~", uf e~ch can c:ocxist with everyone's freedom in accordance with II universallaw.',2J
In contrast when tlrst stated as the sole single categorical imperative, in tne
Groundwork. the principle reads as follows: "act on!.v in accordance with that
maxim through which )'OU can at the same time will that it should become a universa/law. ,,24
!O MS, VI, 218.
21 MS, VI, 224.
II MS, V12}()
2)

Ibid. Quotation marks in Ihe originaL
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The reference here to "maxim" has been much discussed. The significance of its

mention is as follows: Maxims are iuner statements of policies of action (together
with the end to be gained by such actions, and the motives moving us to perfonn
such actions from such ends (see my article on maxims) that the agent has adopted
(or is considering adopting). Thus the kind of constraint on action that is under discussion here is inner self-constraint, rather than constraints imposed externally by
threats of punishment, for example. The principle of the Rechtslehre therefore
should not mention maxims. and yet it does. However, Kant immediately explains
that such a principle of Recht cannot require thai we act upon a particular maxim.
The content of one's maxims is the subject of the inner side of morality, ethics?S
Kant adds that this principle of right is limited to external actions only. But he
adds, the idea of Recht does not expect that we should follow such rules for their
own sake: '"instead, reason says only that freedom is limited to those conditions in
conformity with the idea of it and that it may also be actively limited by others:,26
When we are setting forth what is merely right, "one need not and should not represent that law of right as itself the incentive of action." Thus in spite of the mention of "maxims" in its statement, the present statement of Recht is clearly distinguished from the more familiar categorical imperative as found in the Groundwork. In fact Kant immediately goes on to connect this principle of right with an
authorization to use coercion, i.e., external force.
Both fonnulations under discussion here mention the same key phrase '"universal law." This marks them as different versions of the same principle, the moral
law or categorical imperative. Now since the principle of right is limited to those
c<lses where the l'~e of extern") force may be undertaken, thi~ 1imit~ thr- ~C(l~ of
this principle, and thereby marks off a separate subject matter for the doctrine of
virtue, which precisely deals with such inner motivations and demands of morality.
Thus the principle of RechT would cover required payment of taxes, and abstaining
from murder, assault. and theft, but it would not cover the duty of giving to charity
or the duty to abstain from being servile.
There is a considerable literature on the connections between the different formulations of the categorical imperative in the GroundlFork, and in particular on
Kant's claim that the fonnulations are equivalent. Within this literature there are
some major scholars who claim that Kant does better with what is called the second formulation, having to do with respect for persons, and persons as ends in
themselves (Thomas Hill, Allen Wood), and this is a position I have considerable
symp<lthy for. However, at this point ill the Reclus/ehre, Kant gives us only a version of the "universal law" formulation, usually called the first fonnulalion (il has
two versions in the Groundwork, "universal law" and "universal law of nature.").
This may suggest a kind of primacy for the first formulation, or it at least tempts
l4

G. IV. 421. italic.~ in the original.

l5

See MS, VI. 231
Ibid

~n
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us to inquire why no other formulations are mentioned. This is a major question
that cannot be answered within the scope of the present paper, but here are a few
suggestions: (I) The second fonnulation mentions ends, which are internal rather
than external. And perhaps the concept of respect in "respect for persons" should
also be taken as inner. Hence such conceptions would have no role in the Rechtslehre. On the other hand, it seems obvious that respect for persons could be
given a partial but significant spelling out in terms of respecting the rights of
others. (2) It might be said that in the criterion of universal acceptability that we
saw being presented in the discussion at hereditary aristocracy, there is an implicit
reference to something like a kingdom of ends. and to the idea that each and every
one of these individuals whose "votes" must be counted is thus an individual
whose rights are to be respected. When the kingdom of ends formulation is introduced in the Groundwork, it is said to combine the two previous formulations,
those mentioning universal law and persons as ends in themselves. So if the kingdom of ends formulation is implicit in the discussion of hereditary aristocracy, so
is the persons as ends in themselves formulation.
This completes our discussion of the application of the categorical imperative to
rule out the arrangement of an hereditary aristocracy. We have examined this application to attempt to discern in some detail how it worh, and how it compares to
(at least one of) the application arguments of the Ground"work. One point which
might be made now, and has not been previously mentioned is the following; it
might have been thought that the Rechtslehre contained no applications of the categorical imperative, and that there was therefore a sort of disconnect between the
Rechtslehre and the Groundwork, and perhaps also between it and the Tugendlehre.
But I would claim that this example that has been under discussion shows pretty
clearly thai there is a unity to Kant's moral philosophy, a unity thal i~ provided by
the concept of the categorical imperative, and that extends to the Rechtslehre. I
will bolster this claim with a few introductory comments on other applications of
the categorical imperative from the Rechlslelut! below.
For the present, let me just note one terminological qualification in the way I've
been speaking of the categorical imperative throughout this paper: perhaps when
we talk about the unity of Kant's moral philosophy as built around a single moral
principle, we should not talk about the "categoricai imperative" but use some
broader term such as "the moral law" because both words in "categorical imperative" have reference to the inner motivational aspects of morality that are at the
center of Kant's attention in the Groundwork. An imperative is said to be "an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will" and necessitation is said to
express a relation between such an objective principle and a will such thai the will
may fail to act in accord with it. n And moral imperatives are categorical because
they lack the provision of a sensuous incentive thai is central to the idea of a hypothetical imperative; they are thus unconditional. for they cite no extrinsic motin G.IV,413.
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vatian that moves the agent to act. This sets Kant on his search for the unconditional intemalist or intrinsic motivati9D that is characteristic of action from duty.
And none of this is directly relevant {O discussions in the RechtsJehre, where the
assumption is that motivation to obey the relevant laws will be provided by external coerCion, and often specifically fear of punishment. I say "directly" because it
seems reasonable to think that those subject to punishment must be presupposed to
be capable of free action, so that Kant's metaphysical theory of human moral freedom is arguably in the background of even the Rechtslehre.
Now there are various other application-topics that are discussed in the Rechtslehre, and that should be discussed before we had completed a discussion of the

application of the Kantian moral law in that work: slavery, and even his critique of
a decree that would say that certain fOnTIS of faith and forms of external religion,
onCe adopted, are to remain forever. 28 But the tWO applications I will discuss in a
brief and sketchy way below are punishment and property rights.
(1) Kant says in what is perhaps an unguarded and unusually explicit moment
that "The law of punishment is a categorical imperative... ,,29, which seems to be
saying that the Kantian theory of punishment that then follows is an application of
the categorical imperative. Kant's theory, as is well known, is a retributive theory,
a version of the lex talionis, which requires the equality of crime and punishment,
and, additionally, at least where possible. a qualitative similarity of crime and punishment, most notably and famously in the infliction of capital punishment upon
murderers. There are various rationales suggested for this proposed standard. One
is that it is the only standard that gives a fixed, non-arbitrary result. Another is that
the justice of punishments determined by this standard is transparent to the wrongdoer. who thus should understand the appropriateness of this punitive response.
There is a certain focus in Kant's discussion of punishmenc3° on convincing the
person who is punished of the approprialeness of Ihis response. Kant actually undertakes to discuss this point in his response to Beccaria31 . in opposition 10 whom
Kant insists that the person punished cannot possibly consent to be punished. The
basic principle of punishment, Kant also tells us. is one of "equality,,32; the idea
seems to be that the punishment restores equality from a situation of inequality and
hence injustice that was introduced by the criminal acl itself. Here as elsewhere
there is a strong contrast drawn between the a priori character of Kant's retributivism compared with the empirical character of "eudaimonism,,33 (MS, VI, 331)
and the Beccaria view of punishment. II is almost, here and elsewhere, as if the
28 TP, VIII, 305. We should add Theon and Practice to the Rechtslehre. for it contain, thi,
interesting example, as well as a discussion of hereditary aristocracy.
29

MS, VI, 331.

MS, VI. 331 ff.
3J MS, VI, 335.
32 MS, VI, :B2
)~ MS, VL 331.
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distinction between deontology and teleology itself exactly corresponds in Kant's
mind with the distinction between the a priori and the empiricaL 34
(2) The goal of the system of laws in the state is to protect the rights of citizens,
and in particular their property rights. The discussion of the Kantian rationale for
property is an entire large and complicated topic in itself, which will not be undertaken here. Let us just say that the point of Kant's rationale for the right of noumenal (legal or moral) possession is that it be such that all could agree to it. The will
of the people are united. There is no unilateralism allowed. That was the basic problem with Locke's theory of property, which Locke, in an imperlect way, attempted to deal with with his "proviso," presented as a limit upon unilateral original acquisition of property. Hence for Kant property rights remain provisional in
the state of nature, and the very idea of the State is the idea of a universal agreement and acceptance of a given division of property as appropriate. Little is said
either by way of justification or critique of actual (empirical?) inequalities of
wealth and property. But justice in the distribution of property, possessed in the
legal sense of a moral/legal right, presupposes the possibility of universal agreement of all citizens in that system.
Now in this case of the Kantian general will (there are obvious echoes of Rousseau here), we are, as Kant himself insists, thinking of the general will as an ideal
of reason rather than as an historical occurrence, and stripped of most empirical
specificity. So votes will not be influenced by jealousies, loves, hates, private
tastes, or other private individual preferences, or by people joining in coalitions, or
making compromises after the fashion familiar from collective bargaining. And,
fnr example. tax or welfare schemes will not be accepted or rejected (within this
standpoint of a concern for justice) because of their efficiency or inefficiency.
Kant's rejection of hereditary nobility might be thought to be in embryo the
Rawlsian insistence, as part of his principles of justice, that offices are open to all,
through some fair selection process. Again, in contrast, particular policies - going
to war with Iraq, eliminating the tax on dividends - are within the proper power of
the state, and must be accepted if legally enacted, The difference is that the Kantian "constitution" is an idea of reason that does not make specific (empirical) requirements, for example. as the U. S. Constitution does (the president must be at
ieast 35 years old, members of congress are eiected fur lWI) y~ar terms. there will
be a census every ten years, members of the federal judiciary shall be appointed
for life tenus by the president and confinned by the Senate).
As mentioned above, perhaps the very reason that Kant is a deontologist and a
rejecter of consequentialism is because in his view this reflects his distinction between the empirical and the a priori. No empirical requirement could be deontological, nor could it have the modal character of all moral requirements. So then
34 for a further discussion by the author on K~nt's theory of Punishment. see 'The Principle of Punishment Is a Categorical Imperative," pp. 169- 190 in Autonomy and Community.
edited by Jane Kneller and Sidney Axinn, Albany: State University of New York Press. 1998.
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there are echoes of Kantian a priorism in Rawls, whose theory of justice is deontological, and whose state also admits of a variety of economic and practical arrangements within the framework of justi~e. The main difference is perhaps that it is
explicit that offices are to be open to all in Rawls, and this is not explicit in Kant,
as it could hardly be, given Kant's position as a government employee in an
authoritarian state with a hereditary monarchy. The righls of office (the right to run

for and achieve office) is another large separate topic in Kant, one to be explored
another time. But if we assume some selection process for stale offices involving
participation by citizens in Kant, then there may not be much difference between
Kant and Rawls.
In conclusion. it should be clear that the whole idea of the application of the
supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative, extends far beyond the
ethical examples from the Groundwork that are so familiar to us, and that in particular they extend in Kant's view to the institutional structure and the system of
laws of the state.

Zusammenfassung
Kant hat sein .,h6chstes Prinzip der Moral", das er "kategorischer Imperativ"
nennt, mehrfach auf konkrete Faile angewendet, urn zu Schlussfolgerungen hinsichtlich spezieller moralischer PfIichten zu gelangen, z. B, in Bezug auf ein
Suizidverbot, ein Verbot liigenhafter Versprechungen oder ein allgemeines Hilfeleistungsgebot. Es gibt aber eine Reihe von Anwendungen des kategorischen
Imper3tivs im ersten Teil von Kants Mctaphysik dcr SiUen (1797), also in der
Rechtslehre, denen bisher nur wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt wurde. In clef
Rechtslehre befasst sich Kant mit staatIichen strafbewehrten Gesetzen, die der
Sicherung der Rechte des Biirgers dienen sollen. Dies fuhrt zu einem etwas anderen Anwendungsverfahren als bei seinen bekannten Beispielen in der vorangehenden Grundlegung ZIlT Metaph.vsik der Sittm (1785), die sich mit dem internen Emscheidungsprozess und der Selbst-Bindung moralischer Motivation befassen. Der
vorliegende Beitrag uotersucht die Einzelheiten derjenigen Argumemation Kaots
(sowohl in der Reehtslehre als auch in der Schrift uber Theorie und Pnnis). die
zeigen soIl, dass eioe erbliche ArislOkratie unzuliissig ist, und vergleicht diese
Argumentation mit der gegen das liigenhafte Versprechen in der Grundlegung. Dabei zeigen sich deutliche Gemeinsamkeiten, aber auch Unterschiede, und es gibt
bezeichnende Verbindungen zu den Thesen von John Rawls in dessen Theorie der
Gerechtigkeit (1971). Ktirzer gefasst ist die Auseinandersetzung mil Kants Argumenten in cler Rechtslehre zum Strafrecht und zum Eigenlumsrecht. Die gesamte
Erorterung wird verstanden als eine Einftihrung in die Probleme, die sich bei der
Anwendung des kategorischen lmperativs ergeben, wcnn diesc zu auBcrcn staatlichen Geselzen fiihlt und nlcht zu internen moralisch motivierten Entscheidungen,
Weiterhin geht es darum, wano Personen abstrakt gesehen im Vorhinein ihre Zustimmung zu bestimmten Gesetzen geben konnten. Bekanntlich bezieht Kant hier-
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auf seine zentrale Unlerscheidung lwischen (I) a priori Uberlegungen, die etwas
mil der Handlungsfreiheit zu tun haben und zu einer moralischen Entscheidung im
Hinblick auf die Rechte des BUrgers ftihren, lind (2) empirischen Oberlegungen,
die etwas mit deT Gli.ickseligkeil zu tun haben und die sich nicht zu Schlussfolgerungen im Hinblick auf Biirgerrechte eignen.

